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The mountain forests of the Indonesian province of Central Sulawesi include core areas of the 
global Wallacea biodiversity “hotspot”. Remote sensing data indicated that deforestation 
rates around Central Sulawesi’s Lore-Lindu National Park differ more strongly between 
villages than could be explained by differences in the individual characteristics of the 
village households as assessed by quantitative village censuses. This setting provided the 
background for a study into inter-village differences in power structures regarding access 
to natural resources. Our results are abstracted from 3*10 semi-structured, qualitative 
interviews with key informants from the leading groups of autochthonous and migrant 
households of three contrasting villages. In village A, nearly feudal power relationships are 
exerted by a group of local “fi rst settler” families that dominate formal village leadership 
as well as the infl uential Council of Traditional Leaders (Lembaga Adat), and that restrict 
deforestation and land transactions. No such institutional restrictions exist in village C. 
Traditional power relationships are replaced by economic power based on petty capitalist-
type production of the international agricultural commodity cocoa. Deforestation is much 
higher in village C. In village B, traditional institutions and power structures still appear in 
place although land transactions are less restricted than in village A, resulting also in high 
deforestation rates. While contrasting problematic social effects, our study highlights the 
potential effi cacy of traditional institutions in the regulation of access to resources.
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Die Bergregenwälder Zentralsulawesis sind Teil des globalen Wallacea-Biodiversität- 
“Hotspots” und beheimaten viele endemische Tier- und Pfl anzenarten. Die Entwaldung 
im Bereich des dortigen Lore-Lindu Nationalparks unterscheidet sich zwischen 
umliegenden Dörfern stärker, als dies durch quantitative Haushaltsdaten zu erklären 
ist. Darauf aufbauend untersuchten wir Unterschiede in den Machtstrukturen bezüglich 
des Zugangs zu natürlichen Ressourcen zwischen einzelnen Dörfern. Unsere Ergebnisse 
basieren auf 3*10 halbstrukturierten, qualitativen Interviews mit Schlüsselinformanten 
und Führungspersonen der autochthonen und der hinzugezogenen Bevölkerung aus drei 
sich unterscheidenden Dörfern. Untersuchungsdorf A ist gekennzeichnet durch feudale 
Machtstrukturen ausgehend von einer Gruppe autochthoner Familien, die nahezu alle 
Positionen der formalen Dorfführung und des traditionellen Dorfrats (Lembaga Adat) 
innehaben und die Entwaldung und Landverkäufe begrenzen. Solche institutionellen 
Restriktionen bestehen im Untersuchungsdorf C kaum. Die traditionellen und formalen 
Machtverhältnisse wurden hier weitgehend durch ökonomische Machtverhältnisse ersetzt, 
welche sich wiederum auf den Erwerbsanbau der internationalen Handelsware Kakao 
gründen. Die Abholzungsraten sind hier deutlich höher. Im Dorf B sind die traditionellen 
Machstrukturen oberfl ächlich noch vorhanden, Landverkäufe sind aber weniger stark 
begrenzt – und die Abholzungsraten ebenfalls recht hoch. Zusammenfassend belegt die 
Studie die relative Effektivität traditioneller Institutionen, den Zugang zu natürlichen 
Ressourcen zu regulieren, deckt jedoch auch deren problematische soziale Auswirkungen 
auf.
Schlagworte: Entwaldung, Allmendegüter, Dorf-Institutionen, Indonesien 
Introduction
In spite of more than three decades of scientific discussion amongst environmental and 
resource economists, the driving forces of tropical rainforest conversion continue to be 
a matter of debate (Barbier & Burgess 2001; Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Barraclough & 
Ghimire 1995). In addition to large-scale deforestation, for example, for timber extraction 
and palm-oil plantations, small-scale forest conversion accounts for a significant proportion 
of current deforestation (Sunderlin & Resosudarmo 1996). Institutions play a decisive role in 
the sustainable or non-sustainable utilization of many natural resources (Acheson 2006; Stern 
et al. 2002; Ostrom 1990). Institutions are defined as any form of constraint that shapes 
human interaction (North 1990: 4). Formal institutions include laws, official regulations, 
and administrative procedures while informal institutions include private conventions, non- 
codified norms and modes of behavior, customs and traditional values. One institutional 
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arrangement affecting tropical deforestation is an ill-defined property rights structure which 
rewards individual resource exploitation while damaging overall resource availability (Mishan 
1969).
For cases of a non-sustainable exploitation of common pool of resources (“Tragedy of the 
Commons”; Hardin 1968), local self-governance is frequently cited as a potential solution at the 
institutional level. Here, the resource needs to be considered as subject to common property 
rights instead of as an ‘open-access’ good which may be exploited by anyone (Acheson 2006; 
McKean 2000; Bromley 1992; Ostrom 1990). Numerous case studies have examined design 
principles for an effective governance of common pool resources suggested by Ostrom (1990). 
These studies generally support the soundness and effectiveness of the suggestions (Quinn et 
al. 2007; Gautam & Shivakoti 2005). 
However, the propagation of local self-governance has its critics. Empirically, it is not clear, 
yet, to which degree positive findings concerning resource conservation can be extrapolated 
(Barraclough & Ghimire 1995). Furthermore, the cultural and human dimensions of effective, 
but often very restrictive local resource management regimes are frequently ignored 
(Cooke & Kothari 2007; O‘Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann 2002; Campbell et al. 2001). For a more 
comprehensive view of local self-governance of common pool resources, a close investigation 
of the interaction of population characteristics and the environment is required at the local 
level (Gibson et al. 2000: 3). These analyses should include an observation of the effect 
of power and status on resource access (Agrawal 2003: 258). Against this background, our 
systematic case study explores institutional inter-village differences, with a special focus on 
the driving forces of natural resource utilization and on imbalances of power between “village 
elites” and dependent smallholders. 
The study took place in three villages in the vicinity of Lore-Lindu National Park (LLNP) in 
Central Sulawesi (Indonesia), which contains extensive forest areas and provides conservation 
core areas for the Wallacea biodiversity “hotspot”4 (Myers et al. 2000)5. We used results 
from census analyses as well as informal interviews with key informants in order to select 
households that appeared likely to belong to the village elite considering land holdings/wealth, 
prominent social position in the village community, and perceived success in agriculture. With 
the heads of these 3*10 households, qualitative interviews were conducted in 2007.
The outline of this paper is as follows: first we will briefly review the general literature on 
natural resource exploitation. Second, a background on common pool resource management 
4 The concept of biodiversity “hotspots” was originally developed by Myers (1988). A hotspot is a biogeographic 
region with a significant reservoir of biological diversity which is threatened by destruction. According to Myers 
et al. (2000), it must contain at least 0.5 percent or 1,500 of the world’s 300,000 plant species as endemics. 
The Wallacea biodiversity hotspot encompasses the central islands of Indonesia east of the Wallace Line (mainly 
Sulawesi, the Maluku Islands and Nusa Tenggara) but west of Papua.
5 The research is part of DFG-funded collaborative research center SFB 552 – STORMA “Stability of Rainforest 
Margins in Indonesia”. We would like to thank DFG and Otto Vahlbruch-Stiftung for funding.
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and their relation to social and environmental justice will be given. After a short description 
of the three study villages in the LLNP area, methods and data collection are explained. Next, 
our empirical results on local power structures and access to natural resources in the three 
contrasting villages are presented. We close with a critical discussion of our findings, and 
some possible policy recommendations.
Natural Resource Exploitation
The conversion of tropical rainforests into arable land can be viewed as a highly degrading 
utilization of a precious natural resource. Thus, the search for appropriate management 
institutions is a highly important challenge at present (Berkes 1989; McCay & Acheson 1987). 
Garrett Hardin (1968) explained the economic rationality behind a paradigmatic type of
natural resource overuse involving a pasture and local herders in his influential article “The 
Tragedy of the Commons“6. From the perspective of a self-interested individual, it appears as a 
promising resource use strategy to use as much as possible from the pasture to grow one´ s own 
sheep or cattle. While the profits from intensive utilization of the pasture accrue completely 
to the individual, possible negative effects on the quality of the pasture (externalities) must 
be born by the whole community of users of the pasture. If such behavior is wide-spread, it 
easily leads to over-exploitation and final depletion of the pasture – with negative long-term 
effects for everyone (Hardin 1968). This divergence between individual rationality and group 
rationality was customarily explained after Hardin with the specific attributes of many natural 
resources as common pool goods (Berkes & Folke 1998: 6). 
6 Hardin built up his theory on former thoughts of William Forster Lloyd (1833) “Two Lectures on the Check to 
Population”, who analyzed medieval village land holdings and population growth. However, the origin of the theory 
dates back to Aristotle.
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Source: slightly modified according to McKean (2000: 29)
Table 1: Type of Good, by Physical Characteristics
Exclusion Easy  
Private Goods
(trees, sheep, fish, chocolate)
Club or Toll Goods
(cable TV, festive 
atmosphere at a party)
 
   
  
  Rivalry in 
  Consumption 
  Non-rivalry in 
  Consumption
Exclusion Difficult or Costly
Open Access Goods
(forest, pasture, fishery)
Pure Public Goods
(N2 in air, national defense)
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From a systematic perspective, common pool resources share characteristics with private 
goods and with open-access goods (Table 1). Open-access goods are defined by rivalry in 
consumption and non-excludability (Gibson et al. 2000: 6). Rivalry in consumption means 
that a unit of the resource “consumed” by one user cannot be consumed by another. Non-
excludability means that it is very difficult or prohibitively costly to exclude a potential 
user of the resource from actual consumption. Rivalry in consumption and excludability are 
necessary categories to classify goods because a simple differentiation between public and 
private goods is not sufficient for the characterization of natural resources (McKean 2000: 28 
et seq.). Pure public goods (no rivalry, non-excludable) and (pure) private goods (rivalry in 
consumption and excludable) are only two extreme cases of a 2x2 matrix of types of goods 
(Table 1). Many forests, pastures, or fisheries are managed as common pool resources, and 
display rivalry in consumption while potential users are difficult or just very costly to exclude 
– if no institutional mechanisms exist that effectively govern access and use of the resources 
(McKean 2000: 29). Thus, it was claimed that the establishment either of private property 
rights or of government control are crucial to a sustainable use of natural resources (Demsetz 
1967; Smith 1981). 
However, several studies published over the last two decades concluded that neither 
privatization nor government control necessarily lead to sustainable resource use because 
the establishment of effective control remains a challenge for goods for which users are 
structurally difficult to exclude (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom et al. 1999). In contrast, there 
is growing evidence that certain types of joint local management institutions with clearly 
defined rules can be successful in averting the tragedy of the commons (see next section).
Local Self-Governance of Common Pool Resources – Effectiveness Versus Justice?
Along the lines of resource economic analysis, the research tradition on common pool resources 
started with questions on the sustainability of resource utilization (Stern et al. 2002: 457). 
Particularly in low income countries, however, concern on the sustainable use of a particular 
set of natural resources is only one of several socio-ecological and socio-economic concerns. 
Consequently, there is criticism that strictly enforced common property rights regimes may 
lead to social destabilization and fragmentation, and may exclude and marginalize at least 
parts of the local population (e.g., Agrawal 2003; Bardhan 2001). In fact, many respective 
institutions emerged from conflicting claims about common pool resources, but not from 
concern of sustainability (McCay 2002: 372). Thus, an overview of the effectiveness of local 
self-governance of common pool resources needs to be complemented by an overview of such 
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human dimension issues.
Resource Conservation Effectiveness
Based on intensive research on sustainable governance of natural resources, policy makers 
turned away from mainly “expert”-driven top-down approaches to natural resource 
management towards the inclusion of local communities as central actors (Agrawal 2003). 
Key arguments for this paradigm shift were provided by the seminal analysis of resource 
management institutions by Ostrom (1990: 90). She points out that the successful long-term 
management of common pool resources by local communities is historically characterized 
by certain design principles, among them (1) resource extraction monitoring, (2) graduated 
sanctions in case of violations of local resource use regulations, (3) minimal recognition of 
rights to local resource governance. More than thirty design principles have been identified 
ever since (Agrawal 2002: 65). More abstractly speaking, institutions need to be established 
that manage access to the resources in order to alleviate the rivalry in consumption problem 
by suitably limiting overall resource extraction (Berkes & Folke 1998: 5et seq.). 
Furthermore, if such institutional arrangements are applied by traditional communities, 
the complexity of property right structures is often striking. Property rights can include 
distinct use rights, rights to exclude others, management rights, and rights to sell (Aggarwal 
2006). The rights can be exercised by privileged individuals but are mostly held by the local 
community (Bromley 1992: 4; Gibbs & Bromley 1989: 31). The diversity of potential institutional 
arrangements and their differing effectiveness suggest that intermediate forms of resource 
access may exist between common pool resources and open access resources (cf. Campbell 
et al. 2001).
Agrawal (2003: 248) points out, that even the three most important works on the Commons, 
Ostrom (1990), Wade (1994) and Baland & Platteau (1996), “pay relatively little attention to 
features of resources that affect sustainable governance”. Also, a thorough integration of 
impacts of demographics, market access or technology adoption – which are central topics of 
classical agro- and development economic analysis (e.g., Barbier & Burgess 2001; Kaimowitz 
& Angelsen 1998; Shively 2001) is still missing (Agrawal 2003). These are potentially relevant 
influences also for the LLNP area in Central Sulawesi, where Maertens et al. (2006) documented 
that technology adoption can increase forest loss. In sum, local self-governance of common 
pool resources appears as a promising approach to an effective natural resource management, 
although the robustness of current prescriptions in the face of adverse external factors is 
unclear (Agrawal 2003; Agrawal 2002: 71).
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Social Aspects
Humans depend vitally on the provision of environmental goods and services, particularly 
those who live in rural areas of low income countries or emerging economies. For the rural 
poor, natural resources such as forests, rivers, or fisheries often play decisive roles for 
their livelihood strategies (Bardhan 2001: 281). According to the theorists of the Commons, 
the emergence of strong and effective local institutions is central for sustainable resource 
management (see key-principles above). However, successful enforcement, tends to be 
coercive, and in reality often constrains mostly those with the least power (Agrawal 2003: 
257). But even during the establishment of the resource management regime, it can be 
expected that institutional choices are predominantly influenced by the most powerful local 
groups disadvantaging marginal and less powerful groups. In consequence, strict enforcement 
secures an unequal allocation of natural resource benefits. Such a domination of institution 
building by local elites tends to result in social fragmentation, and impedes social progress 
(Bardhan 2001: 281 et seq.).
Although literature has long highlighted the importance of participation in the design of 
institutions governing common pool resources (Stern et al. 2002: 470), it is still a moot topic 
how participation really works (e.g. Cooke & Kothari 2007). Theoretically, participation aims 
at an equal appraisal of the voices and interests of all affected individuals in a practical 
discourse free of domination (Habermas 1992). In fact, participative processes often only 
maintain or even reinforce existing status, power and patronage relationships perversely 
justifying them by recourse to (formal) participation (Hailey 2007: 94). 
With respect to customary law as a typical form of local natural resource management 
institutions, Hodgson (2004: 86) writes:
“Another risk regarding customary law is that it is often taken to be inherently democratic, 
egalitarian, equitable and therefore to deserve support in contrast to formal law and regulations 
issued from distant capitals, which are not. This kind of romantic view is false. There is ample 
evidence that customary law frequently reflects unequal power relationships in local communities. 
Such relationships greatly affect the ways in which land and water are distributed and managed.”
Similar to customary law, “local knowledge” may be impregnated by the views, values and 
interests of those locally in power (Hildyard et al. 2007: 56ff; Mosse 2007: 19). 
In sum, a socially critical analysis of local self-governance of natural resources from a 
justice and equality point of view is as much a pressing issue as the concern for the sustainable 
use of the resource itself (cf. Agrawal 2003). The relative lack of empirical research on these 
broader human dimension issues guides our specific investigation of power relationships in 
three contrasting villages in the vicinity of Lore-Lindu National Park (LLNP).
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Study Area 
Located in the humid Tropics in Central Sulawesi (1º 03’- 1º 57’S, 119º57’- 120º 21’E), Lore-
Lindu National Park covers some 2,290 km2 of montane, cloud and monsoon forests from ~200-
2,610 m a.s.l. (Figure 1). The LLNP area is characterized by rift valleys and a steep rainfall 
gradient from 500 to 2,500 mm per year. First established as an UNESCO Man & Biosphere 
reserve in 1978, it was declared a National Park by the Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture in 
1982. However, until 1993 LLNP was not officially recognized, and its permanent borders were 
not fixed until the end of the 1990s. 
Approximately 136,000 citizens, mainly agricultural smallholders, live in 119 villages within 
the study area of 7,220 km2 around LLNP (Erasmi et al. 2004; Maertens 2003: 22 et seqq.). 
Central Sulawesi is one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia, and the LLNP area is – similar 
to other remote upland regions – considered as a distant, disadvantaged place with fragile 
ecosystems and poverty stricken villages (Li 1999: 34; Li 2007).
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As one of the first activities of the Indonesian-German research center Stability of Rainforest 
Margins in Indonesia (STORMA)7, 12 villages were selected for intensive socio-economic 
research by stratified random sampling with population density, share of migrants of the 
village population, and distance to the road as stratification criteria (Zeller et al. 2002). 
These 12 villages encompass great variation in ecological conditions, as well as land-use 
patterns, socio-cultural and socio-economic conditions. The three contrasting villages used 
in our study were identified on the basis of household surveys conducted in the 12 villages as 
well as additional qualitative research on cultural landscape change, migration, ethnicity and 
ethnicity impact on land-use (Weber 2006; Faust et al. 2003). A census in the three villages 
later documented a gradient of migration intensity and, consequently, ethnic composition. 
With respect to migration dynamics, the villages were categorized as traditional, transitional 
and post-transitional (Weber & Faust 2006). In the following, we refer to these villages as 
village A, B, and C.
Village A represents a relatively static, traditional village type with low immigration, 
and a high share of autochthonous ethnics (~68 percent8 although several different ethnic 
groups are present). The village is one of the oldest settlements in the LLNP area and has a 
strong emphasis on traditions. In addition to a Council of Traditional Leaders (Lembaga Adat), 
an indigenous women’s organization is active here since the 1990s (Organisasi Perempuan 
Adat Ngata Toro/OPANT). It fosters the traditional use of natural resources in the sense of a 
conservation agenda in collaboration with the village government. Land use is characterized 
by a large amount of wet rice fields at the valley bottom. Additionally, seasonal mixed 
cropping and agroforestry systems (mainly coffee and cacao) are widespread. Village A is 
almost an enclave inside LLNP. Free and accessible land is limited as access to land and all 
7 See www.storma.de
8 This calculation includes one hamlet (Dusun V), located at the main road approximately five kilometers away 
from the village center. It is officially part of village A. Differing from the main village hamlets, however, Dusun V 
is mainly inhabited by Rampi ethnics from South Sulawesi. Dusun V inhabitants participate only little in village A 
community activities. The percentage of autochthonous inhabitants is much higher in village centre.
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Figure 1 (continued from last page)
forest resources was officially suspended in 1982 with the declaration of the national park 
(Fremerey 2002: 13; Burkard 2002: 9 et seq.). As the result of negotiations with the national 
park administration, Village A was granted far-reaching self-governance rights to about 23 km2 
of forest land in 2001. In this community forest, village authorities monitor and regulate forest 
resource utilization. 
Village B is less static and traditional than village A. It was relatively recently established 
at the southern end of the main asphalt road west of LLNP. Because of the less suitable 
topography, wet rice cultivation is of little importance while agroforestry dominates village 
agriculture. The population of village B doubled within the last ten years displaying high 
demographic dynamics with a significant proportion of migrants particularly from southern 
Sulawesi Buginese. Thus, village B is a representative of a transitional village type, in which 
immigration has started to impact village life but is not dominating it.
Village C is a young post-transitional village, located in the dynamic region of the Palolo 
valley at the northern edge of LLNP. Local migrants from surrounding villages were the most 
important group of first settlers before and during the 1970s when the Palolo valley was 
sparsely populated in contrast to the lower Palu valley (see Figure 1). The local migrants 
cleared the existing lowland forest for the establishment of wet rice fields. At the onset of 
the cacao boom in Central Sulawesi the 1980s (revolusi cokelat; Sitorus 2004), Palolo was a 
favorite destination for a high influx of regional migrants, mostly Buginese well versed in 
cacao cultivation, which has a longer tradition in South Sulawesi. Today, village C’s agriculture 
consists predominantly of intensive cacao plantations. 
The census data had also indicated strong differences in average land acquisition patterns 
of the single households between the three villages (Koch et al. 2008). The census data 
show that 29 percent of all agricultural plots are bought in village A, whereas 55 percent are 
inherited, and 6 percent are cleared from primary forest inside LLNP. In village C, in contrast, 
56 percent are bought, only 18 percent are inherited and 13 percent are cleared from forests 
inside LLNP. In village B, 35 percent are bought, 41 percent are inherited and 14 percent 
of the plots are cleared from community forest close to but outside LLNP. High levels of 
forest conversion (villages B, C) are related to the sale of land by locals to Buginese migrants 
(p<0.01). 
 
Methods and Data
In the three villages, a household census (n=898) focusing on household characteristics including 
livelihood strategies, resource access and social position in the village was conducted in 2004. 
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Based on extensive background analysis including the census data, the first author conducted 
informal interviews with key informants in the villages to select ten households per village 
that appeared likely to belong to a village “elite”. Without a formal definition (see Dasgupta 
& Beard 2007, for example), we considered land holdings/wealth, prominent social position in 
the village (member of formal or traditional leadership), and perceived success in agriculture 
as criteria to select “elite” households. With these 3*10 households, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews were conducted from March to June 2007. The interviews followed a “problem-
centred interview” (PCI) approach (Witzel 1989: 227fet sqq.) focusing on natural resource 
use patterns. They included questions on village-level institutions and the related power 
structures that govern infra-village resource access and use decisions. 
The 2004 census had already generated quantitative estimates on issues such as household 
forest conversion and land transactions. For this study, we chose a qualitative research 
methodology as a complement as the capacity of quantitative surveys to obtain meaningful 
information on potentially sensitive topics such as (technically illegal) deforestation is limited 
due to standardization requirements (cf. Berg 2007; Miles & Huberman 1994). Furthermore, 
we hoped that a qualitative approach would provide us with deeper insights into processes 
and background influences on village level resource management. 
The interviews were structured by a flexible interview guide allowing, e.g., for non-
standardized comments and explanations, as well as the incidental coverage of additional 
aspects when deemed necessary by the interviewer. All interviews were either conducted 
in Indonesian (or in rare cases in a local language) supported by an Indonesian assistant. The 
interviews were recorded in full. In a second step, the complete material was transcribed 
and subsequently translated into English. We are aware that any translation results in a loss 
of information. However, we were primarily interested in processes and structures in the 
village community that can be described in very plain language. A more in depth analysis onto 
underlying psychological factors behind resource use decisions may have required different 
observational and interview techniques. Furthermore, shortly after finishing an interview, 
relevant outcomes and the circumstances of the interview situation were jointly discussed with 
the assistant and documented. Unclear parts of the interview or potential misunderstandings 
were immediately clarified. 
Since we are interested in specific issues with regard to natural resource use patterns, a 
rule-guided systematic coding following Mayring’s (2007) qualitative content analysis approach 
was applied. “For a content analysis to be replicable, the analysts must explicate the context 
that guides their inferences” (Krippendorff 2004: 24). Therefore, the coding system was 
developed based on an interplay of inductive and deductive procedures (Witzel 1989: 233).
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Results 
In the traditional village A, all interviewed individuals highlighted the strong influence of local 
institutions mainly exerted by the Council of Traditional Leaders (Lembaga Adat). A clan of 
families belonging to the first settlers in village A dominates almost all positions in the formal 
village leadership. Besides the Lembaga Adat, its members also occupy the positions of the 
village head (Kepala Desa) and the custom institution (Badan Perwakilan Desa/BPD). To be 
a member of the village government, i.e. factually one of the three institutions, candidates 
must be indigenous. “[…] the members of village government should be the indigenous 
of Kulawi” (teacher; indigenous, village A). Although the village head and the traditional 
leaders are elected, positions are often passed from one family member to another. This is 
particularly true for the members of the Lembaga Adat that has a strong role in village A (see 
below). Furthermore, only the indigenous people are allowed to participate in the elections. 
Generally, the others are merely informed about the results. These power inequalities are 
also reflected in land holdings. Members of the village government, often stemming from the 
families of the first settlers, possess large land holdings – some of them even more than they 
are able to cultivate.
These local institutions are effectively in control of access to local natural resources, i.e. 
mainly to the forest resources assigned to the village. If a household has too little land to cover 
its basic needs, the head of the concerned household will appear at a Lembaga Adat meeting, 
explain his/her cause, and hope for the appropriation of a forest plot. In addition to access 
to land and forest plots, the Lembaga Adat grants permissions for the extraction of timber 
and non-timber forest products (NTFP) such as rattan or dammar. Regularly, punishments 
are imposed by the formal village leadership if villagers violate Lembaga Adat resource use 
regulations.
The same procedures apply principally to migrants intending to settle in the village. Poor, 
recent migrants are discriminated against, however. This is most obvious in cases of smaller 
land appropriations, or more restricted access to other forest resources: ”[…] some people are 
being pressured not to take forest products while others were allowed to do. So sometimes 
I intend to ask where the justice is!” (migrant, village A). In addition to the inability to 
acquire a position in the traditional leadership, some respondents also report that migrants 
are discriminated against by restrictions in the use of public spaces in village A.
The land assigned to households in need stems from a community forest located inside LLNP 
for which the formal village leadership negotiated “traditional” – restrictive – use rights from 
the LLNP administration. Since there is no “free” land any more, the community forest serves 
as the only source for land expansion. As a result of land scarcity and land use restrictions, 
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some villagers already moved to other places in search of land. The community forest is 
divided into six zones. In one zone, for example, cultivation is strongly prohibited because it 
serves as a habitat for scarce flora and fauna and as a water source. In a traditional use zone, 
shifting cultivation with up to 25 years of fallow can be practiced. 
Immigration by members of other ethnic groups is strictly discouraged by very restrictive 
regulations on land purchases. The village government hinders villagers in obtaining private 
land titles – which are seen as a prerequisite for land purchases by the most successful regional 
migrants, the Buginese. Differing from other villages in the research area, land transactions 
must be reported in advance to the Kepala Desa. Together with the Lembaga Adat, the village 
head will decide whether any proposed land transaction will be allowed or not. Furthermore, 
the size that could be sold is restricted by the Lembaga Adat. Finally, it is not allowed to resell 
formerly purchased plots to others except to the erstwhile owner. 
Village B is to some degree similar to village A. Traditional institutions and power structures 
appear to be still in place. The Lembaga Adat serves as the guardian of the customary 
institutions. It grants access to a community forest outside LLNP only to autochthonous 
households. Also village regulations concerning natural resource use and designed by village 
head and Lembaga Adat exist. The regulations do not exist in written form, and are not 
fully implemented. Notwithstanding rules and regulations, there is a lack of monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms in the village. Therefore, fines and punishments are rarely 
imposed.
Similar to village A, migrants are completely excluded from any kind of position in the 
formal village government. “[For] migrants it is impossible to be involved in traditional 
leadership” (village official, local, village B). However, some economically successful cacao 
farmers who are migrants were invited to participate in village meetings on agricultural 
development. This was done because several local farmers were also interested to turn from 
subsistence agriculture to market-oriented cacao cultivation. Most local cacao farmers adopt 
cultivation technologies from successful Buginese migrants well-versed in more intensive 
cacao cultivation.
Since timber trade is officially prohibited in the Lore Lindu area, only fuel wood and 
timber for private construction purposes – but not for sale – are allowed to be extracted. The 
regulations forbid agriculture on steep slopes >45º because of the possibility of landslides and 
to preserve the headwaters to secure the village’s water provision. However, land scarcity 
induces some poorer local households to extract forest products, such as rattan, as an 
important source of cash income. 
In contrast to village A, land transactions are not restricted in village B. Because migrants 
are not allowed to convert forest into new agricultural plots, Buginese migrants – as well as 
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better-off autochthonous households – acquire land via purchase from poorer, local households. 
Groups of autochthonous, partly land-stripped households (15-20 persons) collectively prepare 
new agricultural land via conversion of uphill (primary or secondary) forest. This is mostly 
done in the area of the community forest located outside of LLNP. In combination with the 
absence of effective monitoring and sanctioning of perpetrations of formal and customary 
law, this two step conversion patterns results in high rates of forest conversion and natural 
resource depletion. 
Although excluded from traditional leadership positions, migrants are not as discriminated 
against as in village A. According to the former village headman, differences between 
autochthonous and migrants should be diminished in favor of a unified village community: 
“The one from Ujung Pandang or Toraja, never [should] think that they are Buginese, Torajanese 
[; they should] claim themself as Lempeleronese” (former Kepala Desa, local, village B). 
In migration dominated village C, traditional power relationships are replaced by economic 
power structures dominated mostly by Buginese migrants from South Sulawesi who are 
substantially more prosperous than the autochthonous households due to more effective 
cacao cropping. The village headman and the BPD are the formal governance organizations, 
and even a Lembaga Adat exists. However, neither the formal nor the customary institutions 
are as powerful as in villages A or B. It appears completely possible for migrants to hold a 
position in the formal village government (Kepala Desa, BPD). The low importance of these 
institutions is reflected by the fact that formally important legal village representatives (BPD) 
are not even known by many inhabitants of village C, be they migrants or locals.
Autochthonous as well as Buginese interviewees agree that a widespread laissez-faire 
attitude on natural resource use prevails. Every household is regarded as responsible for itself. 
No specific written village regulations exist to date. “There are no regulations about the use 
of the forest and its products in this village” (Kepala Desa, village C). Rules and regulations 
with regard to the national park exist only at the regional and national level. Locally, neither 
monitoring nor sanctioning is established. The BPD and the village headman drew up some 
regulations about natural resource use. For example, an extraction fee for rattan and timber of 
25.000 IDR/m³ materials was envisioned to be paid to the village government. However, these 
regulations are only partly enforced. In addition, there are attempts to dissuade smallholders 
from farming steep slopes inside LLNP. In absence of forest resources and “free” land outside 
LLNP, these regulations are disregarded more often than honored. 
Virtually without institutional restrictions, Buginese migrants – as well as some better-off 
local households – acquire land via purchase from poorer, local households. The land-stripped 
local households, in turn, acquire new land by illegally clearing primary forest inside LLNP. 
These new plots are of inferior land use quality, and of a highly precarious tenure status. 
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In contrast to village A or B, newly converted plots are reported to the Kepala Desa only 
after establishment because permissions from the village leadership are not needed9. “It 
is common here that everybody goes to the forest without permission” (local, village C). 
Furthermore, while our respondents report that fines and punishments were imposed in the 
past, this is not the case today. 
Discussion & Conclusion
In this concluding section, we first synthesize the results from the three villages with a special 
emphasis on the questions, how the differences in local resource governance between the 
three villages influence their effectiveness, and their social impact. In the introduction, we 
singled out three characteristics of historically successful resource management regimes: (1) 
resource extraction monitoring, (2) graduated sanctions in case of violations of local resource 
use regulations, (3) minimal recognition of rights to local resource governance. Although more 
characteristics may be important, we will focus on these three to determine if an ineffective 
9 In order to minimize land conflicts within the community, the Kepala Desa usually issues a letter that 
documents the establishment of a certain plot for a small fee.
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Source: own compilation
Table 2:  Social and Resource Conservation Aspects Regarding Village Institutions
 
  
Resource
Conservation
Aspects
Social Aspects
Village A  
Enforced common pool 
resources: 
Local institutions 
strongly preserve 
natural resources 
in LLNP (low forest 
conversion rate)
Feudal, traditional 
power relationships
Strong & effective 
discrimination 
against migrants incl. 
land transactions
Village B  
Partly enforced 
common pool 
resources:
Local institutions 
only prevent migrants 
from conversion of 
community forest 
outside LLNP (high 
forest conversion rate)
Traditional power 
structures in transition
Partly-effective 
discrimination/
exclusion particularly; 
not effective regarding 
land transactions
Village C  
Factual open access 
resources: 
Neither official legal 
nor local customary 
institutions protect 
LLNP forests (high 
forest conversion rate, 
landslides & floods)
Economic power 
structures
Progressing socio-
economic exclusion 
of poor locals after 
land sell-off 
open access situation or a potentially effective common pool situation with respect to access 
to forest land dominates. 
Village A is ruled by a group of families relying on local and traditional institutions for 
controlling natural resource access. All three of the above characteristics are in place in 
order to render the – rather restrictive – regulations effective. Villagers must ask the local 
village leadership for permission for any natural resource extraction, particularly for the 
assignment of forest land, and perpetrators are punished. The local institutions – as well as 
the exclusive use of rights in favor of the village A community – are acknowledged by the 
(national level) national park authorities. Although it is unclear if the negotiated use rights 
inside LLNP are actually compatible with official national park law, the agreement with the 
village government is honored by the Central Sulawesi national park administration. This has 
enabled the leadership institutions of village A to exercise a relatively effective monitoring of 
their common property rights with respect to outside settlers and resource extractors as well 
as with respect to locals. One “objective” effect of the combination of restrictive procedures 
for granting access and a reasonably effective monitoring is the low forest conversion in 
comparison to villages B and C. Only 6 percent of all plots covered by the census in 2004 were 
cut by their owners from the original forest. From an effectiveness point of view, village A can 
be regarded as a relatively successful case of local self-governance of natural resources. 
At first glance, the situation appears similar in village B from an institutional point of view. 
Also, traditional institutions (Lembaga Adat, local regulations for land access) are in place. 
As in village A, migrants are denied access to forest land. Because the village possesses a 
community forest outside LLNP, there was no need, however, to negotiate restrictive use 
rights from the national part administration or other state or province authorities. As a result, 
local smallholders enjoy relatively open access to the land of the community forest. In this 
situation, there is no immediate need for strict monitoring or for imposing sanctions against 
locals who illegally use LLNP land on part of the village government. While higher level 
administrations acknowledge village B s´ rights to their community forest, the village is not 
responsible for LLNP land. Although migrants are effectively excluded from the conversion of 
forest land in the community forest, it is a small difference in local land regulations compared 
to village A that additionally fosters forest conversion: Locals are allowed to sell their land to 
agronomically often more successful migrants. Because locals possess the social capital – i.e., 
here, a little restricted access right – to covert new forest, they have an incentive to improve 
their short-term lot by selling their land and acquiring new forest plots that are cleared. 
These circumstances explain the high percentage of 14 percent of all plots being cleared from 
original forest. 
In contrast to villages A and B, no traditional village-level institutions limit access to natural 
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resources and forest land in village C. After local flooding and increasing land slides, there 
are recent attempts by the official village leadership (Kepala Desa, BPD) to establish some 
restrictions on the utilization of LLNP land, for example on the steepest slopes. However, 
implementation of monitoring is weak, and perpetrators are not punished at present. In face 
of the massive intrusion into LLNP land (13 percent of all land cleared from original forest), it is 
doubtful if the LLNP administration will back any local claim to the self-governance of natural 
resources including access to forest land. As in village B, land transactions from locals to 
migrants with more highly developed cacao cropping technology are not inhibited, and locals 
enjoy nearly open access to new forest. Legally, access is not open of course. But the LLNP 
administration does not muster the repressive force that would be necessary to substantially 
halt or even revert deforestation. In sum, all highlighted institutional preconditions for a 
successful self-governance of natural resources are missing in village C. 
As suggested for woodland management in Zimbabwe (Campbell et al. 2001), the 
differentiation between common pool resource and open access resources is useful for 
explaining some differences in the sustainability of resource use (village A versus village C) 
but not all: In spite of a common property community forest, deforestation rates are very 
high in village B. If looking in detail at the resource use institutions of the three villages, 
further differences regarding the existence of monitoring, sanctions in case of violations, 
and recognition of rights to local resource governance become obvious (Ostrom 1990). Our 
case study documents how the interplay of these three factors can differ in adjacent villages 
at the margin of the same national park. Although the differences in the percentage of 
agricultural plots cleared from original forests is certainly also influenced by other factors, 
our analysis clearly documents the decisive role that such local institutions play for resource 
conservation effectiveness. The question who establishes and/or maintains the local resource 
use institutions leads to the second main research question of this paper. Is successful local 
self-governance of natural resources associated with problematic social impacts, particularly 
under equality and exclusion aspects? 
In none of the three investigated villages, we encountered substantial participatory or 
democratic processes that justified or legitimized existing (or non-existing) local resource 
access institutions. In fact, it appears justified to describe this aspect of village governance 
as being nearly completely dominated by the respective village “elites”. Their importance 
for local natural resource governance in the project area was also highlighted by Burkard 
(2002: 38). He investigated villages at the eastern margin of LLNP. Until very recently, village 
leaders had the power to distribute resources as they liked. This is partly an inheritance 
of Suharto’s New Order Era policies during which village leaders could behave like “Little 
Gods” (Faust et al. 2003: 13; Tsuyoshi 1989). They could allocate land at their own will, and 
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rather freely take financial advantages of their position. Studies from Java (Indonesia) show, 
however, that such elite capture depends on the structure of a community (Dasgupta & Beard 
2007). Communities where both elite and non-elite households participate in self-governance 
demonstrate an ability to reduce elite capture. 
The village elites are structured differently, and local resource use institutions as well 
as social outcomes differ strongly. In village A, nearly “feudal” power relationships enforce 
strict limitations regarding access to natural resources including land conversion. This power 
is exerted by a group of autochthonous “first settlers” forming a traditional village elite 
that makes use of a highly influential Council of Traditional Leaders (Lembaga Adat) besides 
formal leadership structures. Through denying villagers full property rights even to their 
existing non-forest land (strongly limited fungibility), a key process that enhances forest 
conversion and immigration is substantially tamed: Very little land is sold to economically 
successful migrant cacao farmers. In concert with this restriction, (poor) migrants particularly 
from non-autochthonous ethnic backgrounds are severely discriminated against in terms of 
land appropriation, access to leadership positions, and general integration into the local 
community. 
In village B, also traditional institutions and exclusive leadership structures are in place, 
and migrants are not allowed to clear land in the community forest. Still, strong recent 
migration occurred which was facilitated by lacking restrictions of land sales by locals. In 
effect, agronomically successful migrants are increasingly recognized as valuable members of 
the village community. This transition is reflected by statements from within the local village 
elite that favors a united village community spirit. As of now it is unclear if the situation will 
develop into full equality of the autochthonous population and migrants, or if tensions will 
rise when the group of successful migrants starts to demand equal rights. 
In contrast to villages A and B, all traditional power relationships appear replaced by 
economic power based on petty capitalist-type production of agricultural commodities in 
village C. While it would be possible in village C for a (better-off) migrant household to 
convert forest land inside LLNP, the economically powerful migrant households prefer the 
purchase of better land at the valley bottom for which land titles can also be issued. In effect, 
the two-step conversion forest process also described from village B is likewise operating in 
village C – however converting forest inside LLNP. Although no traditional or local institutions 
are effectively in place, poor local households are spatially and socially marginalized. 
The majority of scholars on the commons assert that (local) communities will manage 
their natural resources in a sustainable manner, ensure egalitarian access and equitable 
distribution among their members (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Feeny et al. 1990). This paper gives 
additional weight to critical voices that claim that local self-governance of natural resources 
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does not necessarily result in egalitarian access and equitable distribution (Agrawal 2003; 
Hodgson 2004: 86), particularly if institution building is strongly influenced by local elites 
as in our case study villages (cf. Bardhan 2001: 281 et seq.). In village A, it can be observed 
that successful enforcement tends to constrain some of those with the least power (Agrawal 
2003: 257). Similar trends were found in Nepal where the poorest inhabitants benefited less 
from common property forest than less poor inhabitants (Adhikari et al. 2004). However, the 
absence of effective self governance in the project region (village C) displays a complementary 
social problem: the socio-economic marginalization of poor autochthonous households who 
– not hindered by non-democratic institutions – sold out their land to economically successful 
migrants. 
In conclusion, we find a very complex reality even at the level of only three adjacent 
villages that provides evidence for both positions: 
Local self-governance of natural resources can be an effective means of sustainable • 
resource management if some essential design characteristics are implemented. 
Local self-governance of natural resources may have less egalitarian and pro-poor • 
outcomes that envisioned even if effectively implemented.
Additionally, we document that already a small loophole in traditional institutions (village 
B) can be sufficient to jeopardize the success of a principally well-‘designed’ set of local 
governance rules. With regard to the specific situation in Central Sulawesi characterized by 
cash-crop driven smallholder encroachment and deforestation, the fungibility of land (or its 
restrictions: autochthonous inhabitants may not sell land to migrants) turned out to be a 
decisive factor. 
With regard to practical implications of our study, we can address only one point here. 
The governance situation has generally improved with the introduction of the new village 
constitution (BPD) in Central Sulawesi in comparison to the Suharto era. Our results show, 
however, that the introduction of the BPD does not result necessarily in more legalistic, 
participatory or democratic resource management procedures. In fact, the BPD system is too 
weak to prevent deforestation in villages B and C, and too weak to prevent undemocratic social 
exclusion based on ethnicity in village A and partly village B. In fact, local elites based on 
traditional and/or economic power decisively influence access to natural resources and social 
cohesion. Such power structures should not be ignored, e.g., by development institutions 
(Hailey 2007: 98). In particular, participatory approaches in community-based common pool 
management – as well as idealistic market solutions –, should not naively ignore the existing 
power inequalities.
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